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Abstract
Studies of the United States Space Transpor-
tation System show that in the mid-to-late 1990s
expanded capabilities for Orbital Transfer Vehicles
(OTV) will be needed to meet increased payload
requirements for transporting materials and men to
geosynchronous orbit. The requirement to provide
manrating offers challenges and opportunities to
the propulsion system designers. To provide a
perspective on manrating, this paper reviews the
propulsion approaches utilized in previous manned
space vehicles of the United States. The princi-
pals of reliability analysis are applied to the
Orbit Transfer Vehicle. Propulsion system options
are characterized in terms of the test requirements
to demonstrate reliability goals and are compared
to earlier vehicle approaches.
Introduction
From the earliest days of the United States
Space Program, the issues concerning man in space
have challenged the vehicle designers. This paper
presents discussions, observations, and analysis
of propulsion system characteristics for manrating
an advanced Orbit Transfer Vehicle.
For the 1990s and beyond it is envisioned that
an integrated Space Transportation System consist-
ing of the Space Shuttle, a Space Station, an Orbit
Maneuvering Vehicle, and an Orbit Transfer Vehicle
will exist to deploy, service, and retrieve pay-
loads in high or geosynchronous orbit (GEO). The
system would operate as shown in Fig. 1. In this
scenario, the Space Shuttle would deliver and
return payloads to the station located in low earth
orbit. Potential payloads would include spacecraft
to be placed in higher orbits, Orbit Transfer
Vehicles, and propellants to transport them, as
well as supplies for the spacestation and free
flying platforms for low earth orbit. It is
envisioned that in addition to its scientific and
industrial roles, the space station will become the
operations and service center for Orbit Transfer
Vehicles. Payloads from the Shuttle would be mated
to the OTV, propellants loaded and prelaunch
checkouts conducted. Upon return the OTV would
rendezvous with the Space Station, payloads would
be retrieved, and maintenance performed to ready
the OTV for the next mission. The Orbit Maneuver-
ing Vehicle would serve as the utility spacecraft
for low earth orbit. It transfers payloads and
supplies between the Shuttle and Space Station as
well as places, retrieves, and services free-flying
satellites in low earth orbits. The Orbit Transfer
Vehicle would operate primarily between low earth
orbit and geosynchronous orbit as a reusable
spacecraft and as an expendable vehicle for
planetary missions.
It is envisioned that the advanced OTV will
be a reusable vehicle, based and maintained pri-
marily at the space station. The majority of its
missions will be to deliver satellites to geosyn-
chronous orbit. The vehicle will also be manrated
for servicing missions at geosynchronous orbit.
Furthermore, it will be a versatile vehicle which
can be used for planetary transfers and delivery
of large, acceleration limited space structures to
geosynchronous orbit. The vehicle will incorporate
some fr^m of aeroassist on return to the low earth
orbit as shown in Fig. 2. This maneuver uses the
drag induced by the earth's atmosphere to reduce
the OTV velocity and thereby reduces the propel-
lants required for the retroburn.
The characteristics of the advapcpd OTV are
the subject of ongoing NASA studs s - as well
as earlier Space Station studies. -13 The role
of the Orbit Transfer Vehicle in placing,retriev-
ing, and servicing payloads in high earth orbits
represents a significant departure from current
design and operational philosophy for upper stages
and is driven by the need to achieve significant
reductions in payload placement costs and provide
manned operations beyond low earth orbit. The
requirement to provide manrating of the OTV offers
a number of opportunities and challenges to the
propulsion system designers.
United States Space Program Manratin
Experience
Each new spacecraft and vehicle system in the
space programhas brought with it a unique set of
conditions in terms of the fiscal, political,
legal, regulatory, military, and technical envi-
ronments. As such, what manrating is, and how and
when it is achieved have differed considerably.
Manrating, in the most general sense, can only be
specified within a given environment. It is only
the perception that all practical effort has been
expended to eliminate life-threatening events and
provide for safe return to earth of the space
traveler. Many of the techniques utilized by
designers to eliminate risk and increase system
confidence have been built upon the foundations of
previous manned space projects. Although each was
unique in its environment, a reliance on redun-
dancy, comprehensive quality assurance, and testing
have been the cornerstones.
Project Mercer
Project Mercury began with a series of sub-
orbital flights launched by the Redstone ballistic
missile. These were followed by orbital flights
lofted by the Atlas ballistic missile. Because of
the urgency of the program, no major modifications
were possible prior to committing to manned flight.
However, an intensive inspection effort was insti-
tuted to select each missile component to ensure
that each was as close to the nominal design point
as possible. As an a".lid precaution, a simple
solid propellant escape rocket was added to the
capsule. Monopropellant hydrogen peroxide was used
for attitude control and solid propellant motors
for deorbit. Both systems incorporated redundant
units.
Pro ect Gemini
Project Gemini, which followed Mercury, relied
upon the Titan lI ballistic missile as the booster.
Early in t1% project, it was felt that the Titan II
could be used without substantial change. However,
during flight tests a serious problem was encoun-
tered. The rocket could develop large oscillating
acceleration loads (POGO) which would endanger the
astronauts life. Significant modifications to the
Titan 11 were required to eliminate this hazardous
situation. The escape rocket of the Mercury
Project was replaced by ejection seats. Simple
pressure fed hypergolic propellants were used for
the attitude control and maneuver thrusters.
Redundancy was once aga5n used in the attitude
control and maneuver thrusters, as well as the
solid propellant deorbit rackets. In addition, the
maneuver thrusters acted to "backup" the deorbit
rockets. They were capable of placing the capsule
into a fail safe orbit which would reenter the
atmosphere even if the deorbit rockets failed to
function.
Project Apollo
Project Apollo ushered in a new err to manned
space flight. For the first time, the	 tat
vehicle system was designed with manned missions
as the focus. No longer did adaptations of bal-
listic missiles suffice 14 As expressed in "What
Made Apollo a Success,	 The primary consider-
ation governing the design of the Apollo system was
that, if it could be made so, no single failure
should cause loss of any crew member, prevent the
successful continuation of the mission, or, in the
event of a second failure in the same, prevent a
successful abort of the mission." In applying this
philosophy to the propulsion system elements, each
mission phase was analyzed so that, when feasible,
a credible backup means of safe return was avail-
able. Backup propulsion was available up through
the lunar landing. At this poin
t
., an extremely
simple engine was utilized for the ascent stage.
It was pressure fed with hypergolic propellants to
ensure ignition. Quad redundant valves were
incorporated since they represented the most prob-
able failure point. The thrust chamber was able-
tively cooled. It was designed as though it were
a structural element and had significant safety
margins.
This type of engine was also used on the ser-
vice module since it had no backup for the lunar
escape burn. Prior to this, the lunar descent
engine acted as the backup.
It was during the Apollo Program that the
concept of "limit testing" was invoked to provide
the imeans to control test costs while meeting the
requirements for manned flight. Hardware was sub-
jected to testing significantly in excess of the
mission requirements — pushing to the limit. The
mission requirements of the third stage of the
Satdrn V called for an engine burn application of
5UO sec, but each engine possessed a minimum usable
life of 3750 sec. Limit testing provided the means
to demonstrate reliability and confidence without a
prohibitively 'large test sample hardware cost.
This combination of component redundancy,
backup redundancy, limit testing, and a comprehen-
sive quality assurance program provided the Apollo
manrating.
Shuttle
The Shuttle Program brought further change and
refinement to the manner' space program. The con-
cept of a reusable spacecraft was introduced. This
meant much longer operating times, more cycles,
refurbishment/servicing — new challenges to a space
program which had been built on expendable hard-
ware. The Shuttle was also distinctive in that the
first flight carried men. Earlier programs had
flown several test flights prior to "manrating."
The techniques developed in these earlier programs
provided the needed confidence for the Shuttle,
Component and backup system redundancy is used
extensively within the Shuttle. For example, there
are five main computers configured into redundant
sets and three Auxiliary Power Units. The two
solid rocket motors and three Shuttle main engines
provide capability for safe return to Earth in the
event of failures. The deorbit capability is
derived from the dual engines of the Orbit Maneuver
System. These pressure fed engines are fueled by
hypergolic propellants from redundant tank sets.
The feed lines are crosslinked so that sufficient
propellants are available to either engine to
deorbit in the event of a failure. In addition,
these redundant engines are "backed up" by auxil-
iary propulsion thrusters which are certified for
extended duration burns. They are crosslinked to
the main propellant supplies in addition to the
auxiliary propulsion supply.
OTV Manrating
As we advance into the 1990s, the environment
within which we define "manrating" is continuing
to change. Having demonstrated the technical
feasibility of space exploration we now seek to
exploit the benefits of space. In this environment
cost effectiveness has become a predominant con-
cern. This requires incorporation of new technol-
ogies and reduced margins to improve performance
and life. The design challenge is to maintain
safety for the manned missions while delivering
cost effectiveness.
The historical data base suggests that at
least two main engines will be needed for a manned
Orbit Transfer Vehicle. However, this heuristic
approach of specifying redundancy doesn't resolve
the questions of acceptahle risk and best use of
resources to minimize risk. For this, reliability
analysis of the vehicle and propulsion approaches
is needed.
Reliability Analysis
The optimum use of resources dictates that
maximum system reliability be provided for minimum
development and life cycle costs. However, the
designer can only speculate as to what will be the
system reliability goal and then seek to provide
the minimum cost approach. Factors influencing the
selection of the minimum cost approach include risk
assessment, subsystem allocations, mission profile,
tests costs, redundancy, and nonindependent failure
probabilities.
Risk Assessment
Analysis of competitive OTV concepts requires
that an overall system reliability goal be estab-
lished which can then be passed down to compare
subsystem options. While any goal could be estabb-
lished for reliability a more credible approachl5
is to derive an overall system reliability based on
comparative mortality risks. The objective is to
provide a similar risk for the astronaut as
encountered in other career fields. As shown to
Fig. 3, an astronaut with a 10 mission career would
need a OTV mission reliability of 0.999 be equiva-
lent to an airline pilot risk over a 30-yr career.
A deficiency in this method is that a comparable
j	 career must be chosen, aswell as determining the
)I	 mortality associated with that career. The data
shown in Fig. 3 is for mortality data of 1969.
Progress in safety and environmental health pr-
yranis have reduced these by nearly 50 percent P-6
!f these trends continue, by the mid 1990s the OTV
mission reliability will need to be NO.9995 to be
comparable to mid 1990s commercial pilots. This
compares to 0.999 for comparable mortality with
1969 data.
Subsystem Allocation
After establishing OTV system reliability,
allocation of acceptable levels of reliability to
the subsystem is next. Several methods can be
utilized. One approach would be to analyze each
system and subsystem within the vehicle and opti-
mize each reliability with respect to total devel-
opment and life cycle cost. Those systems and
subsystems which have low development and high life
cycle costs would receivegreater reliability
requirements. Those with high development and low
life cycle costs receiving lower reliability
requirements. This would require more detailed
description of the vehicle elements and has not
been pursued for this paper. A simple approach
based 
oil
	
data projections aq analogy
to existing systems has been utilized. 	 In the
case illustrated in Fig. 4 the main propulsion
system contributes 25 percent of the total unreli-
ability and must be ti0.9999 to meet the selected
manrating reliability point for the mid 1990s of
0.9995.
Mission Profile
Having assigned the propulsion system a mis-
sion reliability of 0.9999, it is necessary to
analyze the OTV mission so that the single burn
reliability can be determined. It is this relia-
bility which is to be demonstrated by testing.
Successful completion of a Planned OTV mission
to geosynchronous orbit will require at least four
main propulsion burns - Geo transfer, Goo circu-
larization, earth transfer, and Earth circulariza-
tion. Multiple perigee burns may be used when
additional payload capability is needed. Mid-
course correction burns may also be needed. When
these multiple burn scenarios are applied to the
previously assigned propulsion reliability, Rp,
the single burn reliability, R, requirement
must be increased with each addi
Sg
tional mission
burn, N.
RSB - I - LIN	 Rill
For a four burn mission, the single burn propulsion
reliability would be 0.999975 and 0.9999875 for an
eight burn missinn. This becomes an important
factor when the test costs to achieve high relia-
bility are considered as shown in Fig. 5. Achiev-
ing 0.999975 for a single engine would require
ro27 000 tests and 0.999875 would require 55 000
tests. With full up-engine test costs of up to
10 000 dollars/tests, this would be one-half bil-
lion dollars for reliability demonstration tests.
It should be pointed out that testing for relia-
bility is initiated only after a ronsiderable
aegree of system maturity has been obtained and
further modifications are unlikely.
Redundancy
Clearly the test requirements for a single
engine of 0.999975 or greater reliability are
extreme. Redundancy can be utilized to signifi-
cantly reduce the test requirements to achieve the
desired reliability. As illustrated in Table 1 for
0.9995 propulsion reliability, increasing the num-
ber-of engines can reduce the test requirements
significantly. This applies so long as the remain-
ing ongine(s) can successfully complete the
mission.
The redundancy approach can be extended beyond
identical elements to include different engine
types or entire propulsion systems as long as the
mission requirements can be Piet by the individual
redundant elements. Thus, the reaction control
propulsion was redundant to the deorbit propulsion
in Project Gemini.
Both enabled the astronaut to deorbit. It
should be noted that specifying redundancy
requirements such as fail-operational or fail-safe
are insufficient without a reliability requirement.
Overall reliability, Rs, of redundant systems is
high or low depending on the component reliability
(Rc) and the number of redundant elements.
R S = I - ( i - Rc)n
Nm,independent Failures
When redundant components are utilized in a
system, the issue of nonindependent failures must
be addressed. These are the failures which result
in total loss of system ability to perform the
required activities. For the OTV this would be
loss of propulsion capability during the mission.
These failures might be a result of a catastrophic
explosive engine failure which terminates the
function of adjacent engines. They could also be
more subtle design, manufacturing, or maintenance
flaws which result in the loss of propulsion capa-
bility from all engines or propulsion systems dur-
ing the course of the mission. Examples of this
type of failure include the failure of tw Shuttle
Auxiliary Power Units on the STS 9 flight^ 7
 and
the three engine ['gilures on L-i071 from faulty
seal replacement.
The nonindependent failure probabilility, c,
is incorporated into the cficulation of propulsion
system reliability, Rp, as
k
R p = 1: n _n`)rr  (Re) n-a (1 - Re) j (1 -• C)a
J.
where Re is the single engine, single burn reli-
ability, C is the probability that all
failure is not independent and will result in pro-
pulsion system failures, and a cluster of n engines
can operate with up to k engine failures,
4'
As illustrated in rig. 6, for a mission with
a total of eight main engine burns, the effect of
nonindopendent failures is to significantly
Increase the required single burn-single enlone
reliability from that without nonindependent fail-
ures. For exannle, to achieve the 0.9999 propul-
sion mission reliability with two engines and
singlee burn reliability, 0 99988
failures 
withu5rpercent98
nonindependent failures but only 0.99 with nonin-
dependent failures, As shown in Table 2 this can
significantly increase the number of engine relia-
bility tests. The sensitivity to nonindependent
failures increases as high mission propulsion
reliability is sought.
The absolute level of nonindependent failures
is configuration specific and call 	 determined
only through test and operation. Several rocket
engines have had no operational failures and thus
have had 0 percent nonindependent failures - thus
far. Test stand results for engines of similar
complexity to the envisioned OTV engines have
yielded correlations of 5 to 7 percent. In view
of this, assuming 5 percent nonindependent failures
should result in a conservative design reliability.
Every effort, of course, would be exerted to elim-
inate all flaws and maintenance problems such that
a 0 percent failure probability would be obtained.
Manrating Propulsion Approaches
As previously discussed, redundancy is a pri-
mary method of reducinV testing associated with
reliability certification. The design, fabrica-
tion, inspection, quality control, and operational
costs for the propulsion system are not likely to
vary greatly over the range of reliability
requirements, Thus, testing costs and schedule
may be significant discriminators in defining the
propulsion system.
As seen in Figs. 7 and B, the introduction of
the nonindependent failure affects the benefits of
adding redundancy to the propulsion system. With
0 percent nonindepenaent failures, increased
redundancy reduces the number of tests required to
achieve a reliability level, as shown earlier in
Table 2. however, at higner levels of nonindepen-
dent failure probability, the increased redundancy
actually Increases the number of required tests.
The crossover point for equal tests for additional
engines is a function of overall reliability and
number of mission burns and it decreases as these
increase. An alternative to adding main engines
is to provide a redundant backup propulsion capa-
bility, APS. This system would be of an alterna-
tive design to eliminate common design,
manufacturing and maintenance defects. It would
be located in a different area of the vehicle to
reduce the probability of explosive nonindependent
failures.
The use of a backup system is introduced into
the reliability analysis by first separating the
propulsion system into the main and backup systems
with their individual reliahilities. Then the main
propulsion system is separated into single engine-
single burn reliabilities for each engines. The
nonindependent failure equation is used in both
steps. The probability of nonindependent failures
of the backup and main propulsion is used in the
first step and the probability of main engine
nonindependent failure in the second step.
As shown in Fig. 9,tine introduction of a
backup propull,ion system has the effect of desen-
sitizing the Wst requirements to main engine and
backup propulsion failures as compared to no backup
propulsion. This reduces the number of tests. As
shown in Fig. 10, a wide range of propulsion system
reliability requirements can he accommodated with
very little change in number of tests. Also note
in these figures that two engines without APS
backup is mathematically equivalent to a single
engine with APS backup.
Based on these results, it would appear that
a two main engine configuration is the appropriate
choice for the anticipated nonindependent failure
probabilities of NS percent. This remains valid
down to 1 percent, where a three engine OTV would
have lower test costs. Two engine vehicles also
should have a life cycle cost advantage over
greater engine numbers due to reduced system cost,
maintenance and transportation charges.
Utilization of a backup propulsion system
would further reduce main engine tests and would
parallel the deorbit capability in the Space Shut-
tle. It provides the lowest test requirements drwn
to ti0.1 percent nonindependent failures. Further-
more, the Space Shuttle utilizes two engines backed
uo byauxiliary propulsion when returning from low
earth orbit. This is analogous to the OTV return
from geosynchronous orbit and selection of a simi-
lar approach for OTV propulsion wuule be supported
by historical precedent.
Incorporation ofbackup propulsion, however,
will likely depend oil 	 development and life
cycle costs relative to performing additional main
engine tests to demonstrate the required reliaLil-
ity. Costs for a suitable backup propulsion system
are projected to be on the order of 50 million
dollars. Additional main engine tests would cost
no more than 50 percent of this amount. Offsetting
this development cost penalty is the possibility
that a true backup propulsion capability could
reduce insurance rates for the missions. Current
rates are up to 20 percent of the payload value.20
Sources within the inuurance industry speculate
that rates could be reduced by up to one-half for
an ON with the additional redundancy of auxiliary
propulsion backup to the main engines. This would
result in savings of upwards of 20 million dollars
per flight for a 100 million dollar payload and
100 million dollar OTV and propellant cost. These
savings could be applied tow+rd development costs
and the cost of carrying extra propellants to off-
set the lower performance of the backup propulsion.
Concluding Remarks
In the course of this paper we have reviewed
that propulsion system approaches utilized for
previous United States manrated vehicles. The
systems have been very successful, inasmuch as
there have been no fatalities or serious injuries
resulting from flight failures. Careful design,
quality control, extensive testing and utilizing
redundancy, and backup systems have been integral
parts in the success record.
The Orbital Transfer Vehicle designers will
build upon this foundation. Reliability analysis
will be one of their principal tools to resolve
what narrating is when exploitation of space bene-
fits rather than exploration is the objective.
41
Factors such as risk assessment, subsystem relia-
bility, mission profile, redundancy and, noninde-
pendent failure probabilities will be resolved.
In this paper, issues associated with these
factors have been explored. It appears that, in
order to provide ar astronaut with a career inor-
tality roughly equivalent to a commercial pilot,
at least a two main engine configuration will be
required. Nonindependent failures of redundant
engines may represent a serious problem requiringg
many additional tests to assure that the reliabil-
ity goal has been met. However, backup propulsion
capability provided by an independent auxiliary
propulsion system reduces the number of tests and
desensitizes the test requirements to changes in
reliability goals and nonindependent failure prob-
ability. Reductions in insurance rates for an
Orbital Transfer Vehicle with the additional
redundancy of backup auxiliary propulsion could
easily offset the increased development and opera-
tional costs. Furthermore, selection of a two-main
engine system with backup auxiliary propulsion
would be supported by historical precedent, Thu
SpaceShuttle utilizes two engines backed up by
auxiliary propulsion to return from low earth orbit
which is analogous to the OTV returning from geo-
synchronous orbit.
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kTABLE 1. - EFFECT OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY ON
RELIABILITY TEST REQUIREMENTS
[0.9999 propulsion system reliability;
50 percent confidence.]
Number of Tests Testing Individual
engines cost, reliability
dollars
1 -7000 70 000 000 0.999
2 -70 700 000 .99
3 -1 70 000 .90
4 1 10 000 .684
TABLE 2. - EFFECT OF FAILURE CORRE-
LATION ON TEST REQUIREMENTS
[Two engine configuration; four
burn mission.]
Correlation, Propulsion system
percent reliability
Tests
0.997 0.999
0 -150 -270
1 -275 -650
5 1000 2700
10 1900 6800
f,
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Figure 1. - Integrated space transportation systems. 1990's scenario.
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system reliability for 8 burn misr,on.
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Figure 7.- Engine tests for .9997 re-
liability of 4 burn mission.
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Figure 9. - Effect of backup propulsion on engine tests
for . 9997 reliability of 4 burn mission.
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